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1. Introduction
In recent years a storm of indignation has arisen over the role of politicians and civil servants 
in ‘the war against terror’. Spurred by several journalistic and academic publications, various 
commentators have criticized the decision of former president Bush and his strategic advisors 
(Rumsfeld, Cheney) to set aside international and domestic law on torture, thus paving the 
way for aggressive interrogation methods at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib- or torture as 
some will have it.
A specific point of debate concerns the role played by government lawyers in 
legitimizing these practices. Attention has centered on the ‘torture memos’, advisory notes 
composed by the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel. These memos have been 
widely criticized for constituting political advocacy rather than candid legal advice, and the 
government lawyers who composed them for being grossly incompetent (e.g. Clark, 2005; 
Wendel, 2005). Sands, amongst others, documents what he calls the lack of professionalism
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and critical thinking among government lawyers in the Bush administration. He alleges that 
legal counsel in the White House, Department of Defense and the Department of Justice were 
so deeply committed to Bush’s and Rumsfeld’s resolution to win the war on terror, that they 
did not give impartial legal advice, but instead ‘cloaked the policy with a veneer of legality’ 
(Sands, 2009).
The US torture case is highly idiosyncratic, in that it involved highly contentious 
actions by politically appointed government lawyers, which evoked strong reactions from 
legal scholars. ‘For sheer audaciousness and shock value, it is hard to top the attempt by elite 
United States government lawyers to evade domestic and international legal obligations,’ as 
legal ethicist Wendel (2005) argues. At the same time, the case points towards a more general 
question: what are the ethical obligations of government lawyers? Following the torture 
memos, a vivid debate on this question has ensued.
This paper seeks to contribute to this debate on the ethics of government lawyering. 
We concentrate on the ethical obligations of government lawyers in both normative and 
empirical terms. To begin with the normative dimension, we ask the question what their ethos 
should be. The widespread critique by legal ethicists of the role played by lawyers in the 
torture case is premised on the assumption that legal officials should first and foremost live up 
to their role as ‘guardians of constitutionality and legality’ (Gillers, 2004; as quoted by Sands, 
2009: 219). Legality, in this view, trumps a government lawyer’s loyalty to their client. We 
will criticize this view for being imbalanced. Granted, government lawyers have their 
professional role and ethos, revolving around notions of legality and constitutionality. Yet at 
the same time, government lawyers are civil servants, having a distinct set o f ethical demands: 
those resulting from their position in a bureaucracy, led by a legitimate political leader. From 
this perspective, government lawyers, just like civil servants more broadly, have to be loyal to 
their democratically elected superior. We will argue that the work of government lawyers is 
characterized by ethical dualism, just like that of other expert civil servants. In doing so, we 
seek to build a bridge between public administration ethics and legal ethics.
Second, we delve into the ethics of government lawyers in an empirical fashion. We 
wonder to what extent government lawyers recognize this ethical dualism, or prioritize one of 
the two roles. In other words: to what extent do they try to integrate their legal and political 
role? In addition, if  government lawyers indeed view their work as driven by two sets of 
ethical demands, this raises the possibility o f role conflict. We investigate to what extent 
conflicts between political loyalty and legal professionalism occur in day-to-day government 
lawyering in the face of EU legal obligations. Finally, we seek to find how government
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lawyers resolve such role conflicts. What do they do when political demands do not square 
with legal requirements?
For the empirical part, we focus on a particular type of government lawyering: 
legislative drafting in the face of European Union legal obligations. This type o f work 
revolves around the implementation of EU legal requirements into national law, and the 
making of national laws that are consistent with EU law. We do so for the case of the 
Netherlands. There, government lawyers are career civil servants instead of political 
appointees. For the US case, it has been observed that ethical tensions are more likely for 
political appointees (Lund, 1998: 67), whose career to a great extent depends on sensitivity to 
the political needs of his superior, the President. Yet we believe that these ethical dilemmas 
may just as well exist in a career bureaucracy, as decisions on promotion here are also 
influenced by the extent to which civil servants are sensitive to political needs.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we argue that the ethos of every expert in 
civil service inevitably has a dual character. In section 3 we specify the roles of the legislative 
drafters, the possible tensions between these two sets of obligations, and the strategies for 
dealing with role conflict. After a short explication of methodology in section 4, section 5 
presents the findings o f our investigation into the actual orientations and actions of Dutch 
legislative drafters. Section 6 offers a conclusion.
2. Real dilemmas
Our aim in this section is to show that the moral universe of the civil servant in general, and 
that of the legislative drafter in particular, can only be understood in terms of pluralism. To 
arrive at this claim, we will start with the view from legal ethics, which prioritizes legality 
over loyalty to one’s client. We then follow up with the Weberian position, which on first 
view is monist all the same, but eventually prioritizes political loyalty. Complications in each 
position lead us to a pluralist understanding of the ethos of the expert civil servant, implying 
the possibility of real dilemmas
2.1. The view from legal ethics
Legal ethics is the body o f ethical principles applying to lawyers, as found in codes drafted by 
the organized bar, bar association ethics opinions, case law, and scholarly texts (MacNair,
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2003: 128).1 The mainstream belief is that the legal profession is homogenous and that 
government lawyers share the same ethical duties as private lawyers (MacNair, 2006: 501). 
The key ethical principle, according to mainstream legal ethics in the US, is a fidelity of a 
lawyer to their client (MacNair, 2006: 509). In this model, the government lawyer takes his 
democratically elected superior as his client (Lund, 1998: 80).
The fact that a lawyer should prima facie be loyal to their client, however, does not 
mean that this role is unrestricted. Loyalty to the client is restricted by two types of 
considerations. To begin with, loyalty to a client should not be confused with loyalty to a 
client’s particular constituent. As the executive branch is more amorphous than a natural 
person or even a corporation as a client, it has a much larger institutional client setting 
(MacNair, 2006: 253). According to Stokes Paulsen, being Counsel of the President, in the 
US context, means being counsel of the office, not officer (Stokes Paulsen, 1998: 100). This 
position is substantiated by Clark (2005). The margins of loyalty are thus heavily restricted, as 
a government lawyer must not act in the interest of a client’s constituent, who is a temporary 
office holder, but of the underlying entity that is the client. According to Stokes Paulsen 
(1998, 104), a government lawyer who acts upon personal loyalty, becomes a ‘co­
conspirator’. In that case, ‘the government lawyer has concluded he will violate the law not 
because some independent moral principle requires it, but simply to advance the personal 
interests o f individual lawbreakers within the Administration to whom he feels personally 
loyal.’
Second, loyalty to a client is thought to be limited by constitutionality (Stokes Paulsen, 
1998, 86). Just like any other executive branch officials, government lawyers must adhere to 
the law. ‘A government’s duty of loyalty to the administration in which he serves has (...) 
legal limits lest the lawyer become an accomplice in wrongdoing prohibited by law.’ (Stokes 
Paulsen, 1998: 105). According to Wendel (2005, 6), the writers of the torture memos did not 
behave is morally abject because in writing a deficient advise they paved the way for torture, 
but because they violated their moral obligation to do right with regard to the law. In his 
words: ‘Lawyers may not treat the law instrumentally, as an obstacle to be planned around, 
but must treat legal norms as legitimate reasons for political action in their practical 
deliberation. ’ (ibidem).
In sum, in the legal ethicist’s view, legal requirements trump political loyalty, when 
push comes to shove. This position, however, has its blind spots. As MacNair (2006) pointed
1 The precise contents of ethical obligations for government lawyers differs between countries. Here, we focus 
on the situation in the US.
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out, there are crucial differences between the regular client-solicitor relationship and the 
institutional setting in which government lawyers operate. Crucially, the government lawyer 
not only wears the hat of lawyer, but also that of civil servant.2 How are a government 
lawyer’s moral obligations impacted by the fact that they work at the service of government? 
To answer this question, we turn towards the field of public administration ethics.
2.2. The civil servant's ethos
The locus classicus of an elaboration of the typical civil servants ethos is Politics as a 
Vocation by Max Weber. Weber distinguishes the civil servant as a tenured professional from 
the politician. Both live - when we understand politics as a vocation - o f but also for politics 
(Weber, 1991: 85). Essential to the politician’s role is the fact that he is to take lead and 
assume responsibility. The expert official ["fachgeschulten Beamtentums"] on the other hand 
is to serve. "He shall administer his office sine ira et studio- without scorn and bias. Hence, he 
shall not do precisely what the politician (...) must always and necessarily do, namely, fight. 
(...) The honor of the civil servant is vested in his ability to execute conscientiously the order 
of the superior authorities, exactly as if the order agreed with his own conviction. This holds 
even if the order appears wrong to him (...). Without this moral discipline and self-denial, in 
the highest sense, the whole apparatus would fall to pieces” (Weber, 1991: 95).
Two considerations in Politics as a Vocation and relevant sections in other works of 
Weber underpin this ethos of political loyalty. One involves rationality: the civil servant that 
instrumentally implements the goals set by politicians maximizes governmental rationality. In 
Weber's understanding expertise can contribute to realizing goals more effective and efficient 
(goal-rationality), but is unable to valuate different goals (value-rationality) (Weber, 1988a: 
489 etc, 582 etc). Sticking to implementing politicians’ choices of goals, then, is the most 
rational way of employing expertise in office.
A second ground for establishing political loyalty as the core ethical principle of civil 
servants is legitimacy. Politicians in democracy are accountable to parliament and, through 
them, to the people. Because politicians, as holders of democratic offices, are in power and 
may be held responsible for their use of it, civil servants should abstain from making
2 To be precise, MacNair (2006) makes a distinction between public servant and salaries employee. Taken 
together, in Weberian terms, these form the concept of civil servant.
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autonomous choices. Without such restraint, the democratic system of representation and 
accountability would become void and “the whole apparatus would fall to pieces”.3
In sum, Weber seems to a vision of a singular and simple civil servant's ethos.4 Yet, 
on closer inspection, Weber's presentation of the expert civil servant in Politics as a Vocation 
is rather shallow and unconvincing, even in his own terms. What does Weber exactly have in 
mind when he refers to the bureaucrat’s expertise in Politics as a Vocation?
Weber mentions knowledge of dossier and procedure ["Aktenwissen und 
Dienstwissen" (Weber, 1968: 225). This kind of knowledge or expertise, however, comes 
down to having specific kinds of information. That hardly is what we usually understand by 
expertise. In other contexts, in fact, Weber presents a more refined idea of expertise, for 
instance in Science as a Vocation. Being a scientist is understood as having a profession. That 
profession involves certain rules and values. In the case of the scientist, for instance, these 
involve rules of methodology, a real engagement in discovering that which is worth to know 
and the professional honesty not to make claims beyond that which empirical research can 
offer (Weber, 1988a: 682 etc). Weber here seems refer to an understanding of expertise and 
expert behavior that goes beyond the knowledge o f certain facts and a sheer instrumentalist 
focus on efficiency and effectiveness in the application of knowledge. It is an understanding 
of expertise resembles to the Aristotelian idea of a good practitioner of some kind, like an 
architect/constructor or a medical doctor. An expert in this line is someone who has the 
knowledge, but also specific abilities enabling him to employ it properly in specific cases and 
circumstances. The expert, typically, partakes in a specific type o f activity, often together with 
others - an activity in which this expertise does have meaning and purpose. For the architect 
this involves the creation of useful and safe buildings, for the medical doctor it means 
enhancing health (Aristotle, 1982; MacIntyre, 1985: ch 14). Being an expert, in short, implies 
being guided by specific expertise-related rules and values.
3 Weber, to be sure, did not provide any substantial argument for democracy, neither in terms of interest 
representation, nor in terms of individual development. In his political writings, however, he evidently follows 
parliamentary democratic ideals (Weber, 1988b). For the debate on Weber’s adherence to democratic ideals see 
(Beetham, 1985; Held, 1996; Mommsen, 1974a, 1974b).
4 This understanding of civil servants’ ethos, built on a strict distinction between the proper role of politicians 
and that of their employees, is often challenged by pointing out the reality of discretionary powers. Civil 
servants, the argument goes, have discretionary powers. That might be the result of a deliberative policy for 
reasons of flexibility. One might even maintain that any rule-following act involves interpretation and therefore 
discretion. Yet, whatever its origin, this liberty to act for civil servants implies that they must choose and 
therefore hold some responsibility (for an overview see Etzioni-Halevy, 1985; Frederickson, 2003: ch 2). This 
comment, however, does not really undermine the central idea of a simple ethos of obedience and loyalty. It can 
be interpreted as implying that civil servants should, when deliberating on possible actions in case of discretion, 
choose that alternative which (presumably) is in line with the goals of the political leaders.
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When we understand experts of any kind working in civil service in this way, their 
expertise is not limited to knowledge of dossiers and procedures. Civil servants trained and 
working in some way as for instance engineers, doctors, or lawyers, find their moral universe 
filled not only by values of obedience and loyalty. The values and rules of their specific field 
o f expertise, the expertise for which they are recruited in the first place, also matter.
2.3. A pluralist ethos for expert civil servants
We observe that Weber, when dealing with the role and ethos of civil servants, focuses on 
loyalty and obedience, while making a caricature of the bureaucratic expert and his expertise. 
When dealing with other issues, however, Weber shows himself to be keenly aware of the 
values that go with profession and competence. Starting from the side of legal expertise, we 
found an ethos that privileges legal requirements over loyalty - without however taking the 
grounds for loyalty seriously into account. Both monist approaches seem too single-minded, 
yet complementary in some sense in their one-sidedness.
The values o f loyalty on the one hand, and those related to the specific expertise on the 
other might in everyday reality function parallel without any friction. Often being a civil 
servant and a doctor (or a lawyer, a architect, etc.) probably will not lead to complications. 
Yet, as the two related sets of values have their own source, tensions may arise because of 
contradicting demands on action. Eventually the moral universe of the civil servant must be 
understood in plural terms and real dilemmas - or contradicting roles if one likes - are really 
possible.
Adherents to the dominant view in legal ethics might reply that there are indeed 
similarities between legal experts in government's service and other kinds of experts. Like in 
other types of expertise, the lawyer can point out what course of action might offer the best 
results and which policies better be avoided. The civil engineer can point out which designs 
are dangerous; the medical doctor can tell what approaches to epidemics are likely to fail; the 
lawyer can point out which course of action is legal and what is, on the other hand likely to be 
corrected in judicial review. Yet, there is also, they might add, an important difference. The 
specific expertise of the lawyer involves legality, and that is of relevance to government in a 
different way than that what other experts might contribute. Legality is what gives (modern) 
governments their legitimacy. Legal expertise does not only help to remedy some societal 
problem through governmental action, it deals with the proper function of government as
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such.5 This specific aspect of legal expertise, it might be maintained, makes for an overriding 
obligation for lawyers in governments' service to let his professional ethos prevail over 
loyalty.
In evaluating this legal ethicist reply we can accept the argument that strict illegal 
actions o f government undermine its legitimacy and that this gives good reason for an 
overriding obligation to resist and remedy illegal actions of public officials or a government 
service for all civil servants, not only legal officers (Bovens, 1998; Burke, 1986).6 Three 
further comments have to be made, however. First of all, the principle o f resisting illegal 
action will probably offer much less guidance than the legal ethicists hope it does. The 
dilemma often will not simply be one of legality or not. Being loyal might not mean 
contributing to illegal actions, but of being more or less lenient in interpreting law, or being 
thorough in doing legal research. Secondly, superiors o f politicians might deliberately act 
illegally, yet not for personal gain but to avoid greater harm (compare the cases o f dirty hands 
that Walzer analyzed (Walzer, 1973)). Does legality in these cases offer the government 
lawyer the right way to act? Finally, and most important for this study, the specific role o f the 
government lawyer seems to be of relevance. His role might be that of an advocate, defending 
the government for some tribunal. He may then use legal arguments in ways he deems 
beneficial for his client. The government lawyer, however, might have another role, being 
more a guardian of legality. This role becomes the more important in cases where there are no 
or only few others who can perform this function. In both roles legality limits or guides the 
official's proper conduct, yet what this means exactly seems to differ. The advocate is not the 
one we expect to judge impartially or to balance relevant legal aspects and interest - there are 
others that have that function. The way we expect him 'to act according to law' differs from 
what we expect of the civil servant who's role is more that of a guardian of legality as such. 
The ethos depends, in other words, on the specific institutional setting in which lawyer works.
In sum, in general terms and in simple cases of (possible) illegal acts of superiors, it 
seems clear that the legal ethics should prevail, but for the larger part the dilemma remains 
real. There is no simple general rule to deal with the dilemmas that follow from the opposition 
between political loyalty and legality.
5 Supporters of this view might refer to Weber's words on legality as source of legitimacy in Politics as A Virtue.
6 Accepting this argument does, of course, not answer the question what is the proper strategy - if  any - in 
specific cases to resist or remedy such illegal actions.
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2.4. A further complication: Multilevel government
Before we can turn to the question what the tension between obedience and expertise implies 
for legislative drafters in governmental bureaucracy, we have to elaborate on yet another 
complication. One that is related not to rationality, but the context of legitimacy. Here, again, 
we can start from a Weberian depiction that, on closer inspection, proves to be too simple: the 
idea of government.
In the first pages of Politics as a Vocation Weber defines politics as related to the 
state. “’Politics’ for us means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution 
of power, either among states or among groups within a state” (Weber, 1991: 78). Observe 
that this definition does not allow relations between local and national governments, or 
between states and supranational organizations to be analyzed in terms of politics. Is there, or 
might there not be, strive for power and influence in the relations between different levels of 
government? Weber, of course, does not yet take into the account supranational institutions, 
nor has he elaborate on the relations between national and local or regional governments. He 
does not only omit these relations in his definition of politics, but also in the rest of Politics as 
a Vocation and in his other political writings. The complex and sometimes strained relation 
between different levels o f government that the 19th century Dutch scholar and legislator 
Thorbecke tried to capture in his idea of “the organic state” (Beuckers, 1983) and that in our 
day and time is often referred to in terms of ‘relative autonomy’ of lower governments is not 
an issue for Weber. Consequently, obedience for Weber can be uncomplicated.
I f  we do take the plurality of semi-autonomous governments into account, the ethos of 
the civil servant, again, becomes less simple. As each level of government is democratically 
legitimate, law and policies of all levels are authoritative orders for a civil servant. Law and 
policies of different governments in a multilevel system might of course by complementary - 
obedience to authority in such a case is a straightforward matter. Authoritative orders, 
however might also conflict, given the relative autonomous, position of lower governments. 
In such a case a dilemma for the civil servant arises (e.g. Berg, 2007).
When we systematize the consequences the two types of complications might have for 
the civil servants’ ethos, the following matrix can be drawn. In line with our arguments the 
top left is least, and bottom right is most desirable. Next we address the question to what 
extent legislative drafters whose work has an EU dimension recognize this plurality of ethos. 
In other words: to what extent to they try to integrate these different roles? In order to answer 
this question, we will first try to specify the tasks and roles of legislative drafters.
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Figure 1 Perspectives on civil servants’ ethos
Recognition of 
pluralism of levels
Recognition of pluralism of values
No Y es
No strict internally oriented servan t strict internally oriented expert 
official
Y es integrating servan t integrating expert official
3. Roles and strategies of legislative drafters
We have thus sketched the dualist ethos of expert civil servants. In this section we tailor the 
general principles of political loyalty and legal professionalism to the function of the 
government lawyer, so as to distill their particular roles. In doing so, we focus on a particular 
type of government lawyer, namely the legislative drafter.
Legislative drafters form a subgroup of government lawyers who play a crucial part in 
drafting laws and regulations.7 Yet they have received barely any academic attention (but see 
Purdy, 1987; Marcello, 1996; Nourse, 2002; MacNair, 2003, 2004), let alone from the field of 
public administration. This is surprising because of the disproportionate impact of the work of 
drafters as compared to government lawyers, or private lawyers acting to defend one 
particular client (Purdy, 1987, 68).
In the Netherlands, legislative drafting is the precinct of a specific group of government 
lawyers: wetgevingsjuristen.8 They are responsible for putting their (junior) minister’s policy 
wishes into concrete form by drafting bills and executive measures (Veerman, 320-321).9 In 
doing so, they combine the tasks of advising on matters of substantive law with more 
technical drafting tasks. They usually work at staff legal divisions, cooperating with so-called 
‘policy officials’, who are in the hierarchical line of a department.
7 The exact role of legislative drafters is bound to vary strongly cross-nationally, depending on the role of 
Parliament in submitting legislation. In the US, for instance, federal level drafters are chiefly involved in 
preparing executive regulations, whereas Congress is assisted by its own legislative drafting office. In the 
Netherlands, drafting is done at the particular departments, which all have a clearly identifiable legislative 
drafting division.
8 The drafters are not the only legal experts involved in the process of legislation in The Netherlands. The Raad  
van State (Council o f  State, an advisory council of legal experts) has the explicit task to advice the Dutch 
legislator (government and parliament) on aspects of legality in drafted law.
9 Please note the difference with the American setting, where drafters work for legislators (see Purdy, 1987).
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Increasingly, the work of Dutch legislative drafters has an EU dimension. In many 
policy areas, EU law exerts influence on the government’s policy leeway. This effect takes 
two main forms. First, the member states of the EU have a duty to implement treaties and 
secondary legislation into their national law. Legislative drafters play an important role in this 
directly EU-induced work, as they advise on and draft the bills and measures needed to give 
effect to EU law. Second, EU law increasingly affects autonomous law making. That is, 
national law must be in line with EU law, as the latter takes precedence over the former. 
Legislative drafters bear the primary responsibility for guarding the compatibility of national 
law with EU requirements, which is a highly specialized legal task. How do drafters go about 
their EU-related work?
3.1. EU-related drafting roles
In this section we tailor the generally principles of political loyalty and legal professionalism 
to the EU-related work of legislative drafters, i.e. implementation and safeguarding EU legal 
compatibility of national legislation. In doing so, we draw upon work by Purdy (1987) and 
MacNair (2003) on the ethical obligations of legislative drafters, and Moss (1996) on 
executive branch legal interpretation.10 From this literature we can distinguish three roles: the 
translator, the guardian of EU law, and the integrating professional.
From the perspective of political loyalty, to begin with, the drafter should be a 
translator of their client’s wishes (Purdy, 1987, 80). They should give effect to the 
instructions given by their superiors (cf. MacNair, 2003, 145), by transforming these into 
legal terminology. In the Dutch administrative system, the drafter’s client is the minister. 
Crucially, drafters in this role conception are not responsible for ensuring legality or 
constitutionality of a bill, but should act ‘non-judgmentally’ and ‘as directed’ (Purdy, 1987, 
79;95). Legal considerations do not enter the equation. That is, not for an intrinsic reason. In 
this view, it is a drafter’s duty to fully inform his superior on the consequences of his actions 
(Purdy, 1987, 100). To fully effectuate the principle of political loyalty, the drafter should not 
automatically transform all policy instructions given by their superior. Instead, he should also 
advise on the risks of a desired course of action, thus protecting his superior’s broader
10 This type of lawyering concerns the interpretation of existing law during their execution. In interpreting laws, 
lawyers help defining it, which makes this type of lawyering resemble legislative drafting (Moss, 1996, 1304). 
What is more, both tasks are carried out in a politico-administrative environment, with lawyers acting under a 
political superior- be it their minister, the president (in the case of the American Office of Legal Counsel), or a 
legislator.
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interests, such as staying in office. Legal advise in this model hence takes a teleological rather 
than a deontological form.
At the other extreme, we distinguish a role grounded in legal professionalism. A 
drafter’s cardinal duty, in this view, is to ensure the rule of law (MacNair, 2003, 145). The 
drafter, in this view, does not only work for his direct, and contemporary superior, but has a 
moral obligation to respect the law (cf. Wendel, 2005). A similar view can be gleaned from 
Moss (2000). Under the neutral expositor model, to use his terms, the government lawyer acts 
as a judge instead of an advocate. That means he should steer clear from policy influences, 
working from the ‘best view of the law’ (Moss, 2000, 1306). He should deliver advice that is 
‘objective and not colored by the exigencies o f a particular circumstance or policy goal’ 
(Moss, 2000, 1310). To what extent does this argument apply to the EU? Crucially, the 
member states are obliged to comply with EU law, based on the constitutional principles of 
autonomy and derived principles of supremacy, direct effect and Community Loyalty. The 
key is that the member states cannot autonomously decide whether or not to comply with EC 
law: they have voluntarily and irreversibly transferred certain legislative powers to the 
Community and are obliged to comply with the legal provisions arising from the use of these 
powers (Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, 1998, 81). The drafter then becomes a guardian 
o f EU  law, instead of a translator of their client’s policy wishes.
Third, we could sketch an intermediate role, in which the drafter seeks to connect 
political loyalty with legal conscientiousness. Moss (2000) labels this role the advocate 
model, according to which the government lawyer- or in this case drafter- is ‘to act as an 
advocate, proffering any reasonable argument in support of his client’s policy objectives’. 
According to this position, which we will call the integrating professional, the President (in 
the US system), or the ministers in the Dutch system, are responsible for their political 
decisions. ‘The lawyer may candidly assess the relative merits of competing arguments for his 
client, but ultimately should not stand as a roadblock to the effectuation of administration 
policy (...)’ (Moss, 2000, 1306).
Yet, this intermediate role is less extreme than that of the translator.11 That is, it 
accepts that there are legal and constitutional limitations to policy wishes, which must be 
guarded by the drafter. The key here is with the term ‘reasonable argument’ (Purdy, 1987, 
85). When a lawyer cannot come up with a reasonable argument, i.e. ‘if the legal hurdles are
11 Confusingly, Purdy (1987) uses the term ‘advocacy’ to denote the drafter-as-translator role. Please note the 
difference with the advocacy model of Moss (1996), which does recognize the existence of legal limitations to 
policy wishes.
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clearly insurmountable,’ they should block their superior from reaching their policy objectives 
(Moss, 2000, 1306). In that case, hence, law ultimately prevails over domestic policy wishes. 
‘If assisting the legislator would involve the drafter in clear wrongs (...), the drafter should 
refuse to so act.’ (Purdy, 82).12 Applied to our case, the drafter is to prioritize EU law over 
national policy objectives, if these are mutually incompatible.
In sum, we can distinguish three competing role conceptions for drafters, which are 
depicted in table 1. Underlying these conceptions are two dimensions: the consideration of 
national policy objectives and the respect for EU legal limits. The translator, working from a 
concern with political loyalty, bases his work on his minister’s instructions. He may take EU 
legal limits into account, but only in a teleological sense, advising his minister on the risk of 
an illegal course of action. Legality does not figure as intrinsic concerns. The guardian o f EU  
law does not take into account policy instructions during EU implementation or the making of 
autonomous legislation, but strives for the best interpretation of EU law. The integrating 
professional, finally, prioritizes policy instructions, as far as these can be reasonably 
reconciled with EU legal requirements.
Table 1 Conceptualization of the three drafting roles
Respect for EU legal limits
yes no
Consideration of 
national policy wishes
yes integrating professional translator
no guardian of EU law other role concep tions13
12 One problem of this role is that it is not clear what the terms ‘reasonable argument’ and ‘clear wrong’ mean in 
the reality of legislative drafting. What is the dividing line between a reasonable and a contorted argument? 
When is a particular interpretation of a law ‘clearly wrong’? These terms are debatable.
13 Drafters which are led nor by national policy wishes nor by EU legal requirements may have another role 
conception, and be driven for instance by EU policy wishes, national legal requirements or their own notions of 
the public interest.
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3.2. Strategies for dealing with role conflict
When political loyalty and legal professionalism pose mutually inconsistent demands on the 
legislative drafter, they find themselves in a situation of role conflict. On the one hand they 
are supposed to give legal advice helping the politician to reach his goals, sine ira et studio. 
On the other hand their professional ethos demands that the experts maintain the rule of law in 
the legislative process. If  a particular policy is politically expedient, but impossible with an 
eye on EU law, these diametrically opposed points of view cannot be reconciled by referring 
to a common value. Hhow do legislative drafters deal with these contrasting pressures on their 
work?
In ordering the various strategies that can be used when policy wishes and EU law 
conflict, it is useful to portray this situation as one o f role conflict. That is, the integrative role, 
which itself is a compromise between that of the guardian and the translator, can be internally 
inconsistent. An individual caught up in such a conflict between role expectations has three 
options: live up to the one expectation, live up to the other expectation, or avoid the role 
conflict altogether (Van de Vliert, 1983). In the following, we will take stock of the strategies 
used by Dutch drafters in real-life conflicts between EU law and national policy wishes.
Before doing so, we draw upon the escalation ladder developed by Purdy (1987). He 
developed several ethical guidelines for drafters, criticizing the automatic application of the 
body o f general legal ethics to drafting. Central to the guidelines is the principle that the 
drafter’s primary duty is to the legislative process and the legislature as a whole- not to 
individual clients. The drafter is to play an intermediate role, seeking to cater to the policy 
needs of a legislator, unless these wishes run into insurmountable legal limits. If  this is the 
case, the drafter should take ‘reasonable steps’ to protect the interests of the legislative 
process and the legislature. Ordered on a scale of increasing severity, Purdy (1987, 83-85) the 
drafter should first sketch alternatives to his principal’s proposal and advise on the 
implications and consequences of the various options. This advice need not be limited to legal 
matters, but may comprise political, societal or other considerations. Second, he may try to 
dissuade the legislator of his desired course of action, using verbal or written statements. 
Third, he may disassociate with the bill, by asking to withdraw from it, avoiding public 
endorsement, or avoiding ‘signing off. Fourth, and much more sensitive, the drafter may 
voice his concerns to others. Application of this option is severely limited by the ethical and 
professional principle of confidentiality, which shapes the work of government lawyers. Fifth, 
the drafter may decline to draw the bill altogether. This is an extreme strategy, which can only 
be resorted to when no other means are available.
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The strategies given by Purdy indicate a piecemeal shift from the integrating position 
towards the rule of EU law. Yet, his typology raises several questions. This is a normative 
typology- to what extent are these strategies used in reality? Specifically, we can envisage that 
in the case of role conflict drafters move towards the other extreme, and serve policy wishes 
instead.
Figure 2 Escalation ladder (Purdy, 1987)
4. Method
For this project, we used data from a project funded by the Ministry of Justice aimed at 
studying the extent, forms and depth of Europeanization o f the work Dutch legislative 
drafters. Part o f this project concerned the role conceptions, dilemmas and coping strategies of 
drafters working on EU-matters. The project consisted of two sets of interviews. First, eleven 
interviews were held with key persons in the field of legislative drafting in the Netherlands.14 
These interviews served to explore the topic and important dimensions to the work of 
‘Europeanized’ drafters. Second, in depth interviews were held with civil servants actually 
involved in legislative drafting. This article will focus on the second series of interviews.
With an eye to case selection, the following considerations were central. To begin 
with, we concentrated on those departments with a sizeable legislative output and a sizeably 
EU legal input. We thus excluded the Prime Minister’s Office, which produces hardly any
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law. We also excluded the departments of Education, Culture & Science and of Defense 
because these two are still hardly affected by EU law. Second, we narrowed our scope to the 
work done in the central legislative divisions. We did not take into account the legislative 
activities of ‘line lawyers’, working at policy divisions.
All in all, we studied 10 out of 13 central governmental departments. At each 
department, we interviewed a legislative drafter and their superior. As the research was 
explorative rather than theory testing in nature, we intended to maximize empirical 
heterogeneity. To that end, we chose for a most different systems design (Przeworski, 1970: 
34), meaning that we selected a group of respondents who differed on key background 
variables. The advantage of this design is that it maximizes the chances of identifying 
different ways o f dealing with EU dilemmas. At the same time, in case a homogeneous 
picture results, this cannot be assigned to variance in those background variables, which 
would render any conclusions more robust.
The background variables we controlled for were seniority and role integration. 
Seniority, to begin with, is expected to affect the basic role orientation towards drafting. As 
several respondents in the first round of interviewees pointed out, a shift in role orientation 
has occurred over the last ten to fifteen years, resulting in a more pragmatic and more EU­
sensitive attitude. This is likely to affect the extent to which drafters experience EU law- 
induced role conflict and the strategies they use for solving these dilemmas. A second 
background variable was role integration. The question here is whether drafters have a purely 
legislative role, or also operate as policy officials. The expectation is that this matters for the 
role conception and dilemmas experienced, as well as for the strategies used.
Combined, the two background variables form four categories, over which we equally 
selected our respondents (see table 1). The respondents were selected in cooperation with the 
Ministry o f Justice. In total, twenty persons were selected and interviewed.
The interviews we held were semi-structured. We worked with a topic list that 
contained the main topics and possible answer categories that we kept developing over the 
course of the interview round. The questions asked were highly open, so as to do justice to the 
explorative nature of the project. Superiors and drafters were interviewed separately where 
possible15, so as to allow them to speak as freely as possible on often sensitive matters.
14 Ministerie van Justitie (ICER, strafrecht), Raad van State, Academie voor de Wetgeving, Universiteit Utrecht, 
Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (ECER) en het Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 
(Bureau IZ).
15 At one department we interviewed the drafter and the superior together, due to efficiency considerations on 
their part.
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Finally, how did we gather information about the three different roles, role conflict, 
and the strategies? To distill the role conceptions assumed by the respondents, we asked the 
respondents what they see as their role in EU-related work. If this question proved difficult, 
we asked them what they view as their duties or objectives in their work. To construct the 
roles, we looked at the two background variables underlying the roles sketched above: 
consideration of national policy wishes and eventual respect for EU legal limits. Typically, we 
then would proceed by asking to what extent respondents perceived conflicts between EU law 
and national policy demands in their work and which actions they would take in case of such 
irreconcilability.
Table 2 Selection of respondents
Seniority
< 15 jaar work experience > 15 jaar work experience
role
integration
policy and drafting 
integrated (Fin, Jus, 
BZ, BZK)
2 drafters and 1 superio r16 2 drafters and 2 superiors
policy and drafting 
se p a ra te d  (VWS, SZW, 
LNV, V&W, VROM, EZ)
4 drafters and 3 superiors 3 drafters and 3 superiors
16 We did not speak to a superior at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, because the legislative function here is 
negligible and an interview at this level would not have added much information.
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5. Empirical results
5.1. An integrated position?
Most of the respondents could reflect on their role as national drafter working in an EU 
setting.17 Only one of these respondents subscribed to the role of guardian of EU law, 
indicating that his primary objective was to ensure substantively correct and timely 
implementation, without making any reference to the interplay between policy objectives and 
EU legality.
At the other extreme, one respondent seems to subscribe to the role of translator. He 
explained that he is led by political loyalty to his minister. In his view, it’s the drafter’s duty 
to think along with his minister and to help him reach his objectives: ‘you are an instrument 
maker rather than an inspector.’ EU law, in his point of view, does not pose an 
insurmountable obstacle to policy objectives. As he explains, ‘we have learnt that we don’t 
need to treat directives as law. ’ This contrasts with the view of the older generation, which 
tended to implement directives in the most conscientious way possible. ‘Now we implement 
in the most attractive way possible. We try to get away with it.’ In this view, it is the drafter’s 
duty to enable the minister to make his or her own decision. If a minister’s policy objectives 
run counter to EU law, the drafter has to advise him, which is in line with the translator 
position sketched above. In the respondent’s words: ‘I would point out the risks, by saying: ‘I 
wouldn’t do it, but if you want to anyway, these are the risks. We are civil servants. ’
The great majority of the respondents, have a more nuanced role conception, and 
somehow try to connect political loyalty with their role as guardian of EU law. In the words 
of one of them, ‘you have to make your minister happy, while ensuring correspondence with 
EU law.’ More specifically, respondents indicate that they are led in their work by their 
minister’s objectives, policy wishes, or policy choice. As one of them explains: you think 
along about the rules, duties, and rights we want to enact in the Netherlands. Such a position 
implies sensitivity to policy wishes, and hence cannot be resolved with the role of ‘neutral 
expositor’, which concerns finding the best view of law in isolation from policy pressures. At 
the other side, these respondents do acknowledge that EU law limits the room for maneuver. 
They try to stay within the boundaries of EU law, while attempting to be loyal to their 
minister.
17 The three respondents who did not reflect on the role of a drafter in EU implementation/the making of 
autonomous legislation primarily talked about their role in EU negotiations, which is beyond the scope of this 
paper.
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Table 3 Role conception of interviewees
role aspects
role conceptionpolitical loyalty EU legality
1 / correct and timely 
implem entation
guardian of EU law
2 political will formation legal requirem ents integrating professional
3 policy objectives limits of EU law integrating professional
4 m inister's objectives / translator
5 m ake your minister happy EU law integrating professional
6 m inister's choice EU legal requirem ents integrating professional
7 rules, duties, and rights w e 
w ant to en ac t in the  NL
EU legal boundaries integrating professional
8 policy objectives (EU) legal boundaries integrating professional
9 policy w ishes (EU) legal boundaries integrating professional
10 political cho ices good im plem entation integrating professional
11 policy w ishes (EU) legal requirem ents integrating professional
12 policy (EU) law integrating professional
13 not d iscu ssed
14 policy w ishes (EU) legal boundaries integrating professional
15 political w ishes EU law integrating professional
16 policy w ishes EU requirem ents integrating professional
17 not d iscu ssed
18 material practice in the  NL EU law integrating professional
19 not d iscu ssed
20 m inister's choice EU legal requirem ents integrating professional
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5.2. Between a rock and a hard place: the incidence of role conflict
‘Politics and business don’t want us to be the best pupil 
in the class. So you are under a lot o f pressure to loosen 
the way you apply EU law. ’
Most respondents hence have an integrated role conception, and try to balance national policy 
objectives with EU legal considerations. Yet, such integration is not always feasible: conflicts 
may occur between a minister’s policy objectives and EU law. Choosing to uphold EU law 
then means compromising one’s loyalty to the minister, and vice versa. In this situation, a role 
conflict occurs: a situation in which mutually incompatible behaviors are expected for a single 
person (Driscoll, 1981, 179). How often does this occur?
Most interviewees mentioned the occurrence of conflicts between EU legality and a 
minister’s policy demands.18 At the same time such role conflicts are not all too common, as 
several interviewees were quick to point out. And if they occur, they are usually sorted out 
quite smoothly. Here, a department’s attitude towards the EU works as a lubricant, as one 
respondent asserted: ‘Everyone at the department understands EU law takes primacy.’ 
Similarly, at another highly Europeanized department, the policy divisions are reported to 
accept EU law limitations on policy.
Role conflicts between political loyalty and EU legality occur at various stages of the 
EU policy process. They may arise during the implementation stage, at which EU law needs 
to be transposed into national law. During this process, tensions between legal quality and 
policy wishes may occur. According to one respondent, ‘politicians have a hard time 
accepting a loss of policy freedom, when there is law coming from Brussels.’ One respondent 
mentioned the high costs o f implementation, which may be averted through suboptimal 
implementation. Another dilemma relates to the actual application of the transposed EU law. 
Often, implementing agencies demand all kinds of exceptions to EU law. Policy officials are 
reported to then put pressure on legislative drafters to think of tricks. According to a 
respondent, many dilemmas relating to EU-law run along these lines, at various departments.
Conflicts between policy demands and legal professionalism also may occur during 
the making of autonomous legislation, as was explained by five respondents. One of them 
conveyed that his division often receives policy demands that are at odds with EU law.
18 In reality, these policy objectives are often not voiced directly by the minister, but by the policy officials 
resorting under him.
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Another interviewee gave the example of a vast deregulation scheme, proposed by a policy 
division, on the basis of which half of all legislation in force at a particular field of policy was 
to be cut. The legislative division indicated that this was impossible, as some 90% of that 
legislation originated from the EU. Another respondent added that these conflicts often 
concern EU law relating to procurement and state aid:
‘In such a case I  will tell them that this is against the rules. Yet 
in some cases they decide to go ahead anyway. ’
5.3. EU-related role conflicts: which way out?
In the case of role conflict, the individual has three general options at his disposal: live up to 
the one role, live up to the other role, partially live up to both role expectations, or avoid the 
situation (Van der Vliert, 1983, 52). What option does the individual drafter ultimately 
choose? First, some respondents indicated that they aim at a compromise between the two role 
expectations, by reconciling national policy wishes with EU legal requirements. The chief 
strategy for doing so, mentioned by eight drafters, is interpretation. As one of them argued:
‘You have to be creative and flexible with the legal 
preconditions. (,..)The main challenge is to make possible what 
(the minister) wants- in one way or another. ’
There are limits to making possible to this ‘conceptual flexibility’, as one of them called it. 
One respondent explained how he would seek out the limits, while making sure that his 
interpretation remained justifiable. This remark may be connected to the notion of ‘reasonable 
argument’, which is central to Moss’s intermediate position. As another respondent explained, 
interpretation in the end comes down to ‘settling the boundaries of EU law’. This is not a 
straightforward task; it is a complicated balancing act involving creative puzzling, as one of 
them explained: ‘When I shape it like this, it may be possible, but if I shape it differently, 
surely not.’ Others seem to be a bit less conscientious, as was put aptly by one superior: ‘You 
shouldn’t take EU law too literally, you have to treat it more flexibly (than national law).’
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I f  interpretation does run against EU legal limits, the drafter is stuck between a rock 
and a hard place, and has to prioritize either political loyalty or EU legality. Of the 15 
respondents with an integrated role conception, four interviewees indicated that they would 
ultimately prioritize EU law. ‘There are limits to flexibility,’ one of them said; ‘in the end 
people have to accept the inevitable. (...) If I’d have to exceed the limits of EU law, this 
simply would not happen.’ Another respondent agreed, stating that ‘there is simply no room 
to help your own sector.’ Another was given by the fourth respondent, who explained that he 
would recommend his minister to try to change EU law, so that it becomes compatible with 
his objectives. All in all, these three drafters would decline to draft the measure, which is the 
most extreme course of action given by Purdy (1987). An alternative, given by one 
respondent, would be go along with the deficient draft, while avoiding to sign it off­
disassociation in Purdy’s escalation ladder.
The majority of the respondents, though, conveyed that they would ultimately 
prioritize political loyalty. These respondents concurred that their political superior has the 
final policy-making responsibility, and that the task of the drafter is to enable him to take 
sound decisions- a principle rather close to the translator role, described above. As a civil 
servant, one respondent clarified, ‘you have to be ‘as loyal as a puppy.’ In the words of 
someone else this means that you may have to work on something that is legally questionable. 
One superior was particularly outspoken about this course of action:
‘A lawyer is not a guardian o f the law. (...). It is your job to serve your 
minister al well as possible. The minister is your boss. You have to 
inform the minister well, and (...) make sure that he knows what he 
does. But when push comes to shove, he is responsible. That is the core 
o f a civil servant’s existence. ’
According to these respondents, drafters should not stop short at policy objectives, and 
translate them without a blink, but make their minister well aware that he is violating EU law- 
and o f the risks involved. Two respondents gave details on such risk assessments. Crucial 
considerations are the chances of a ‘political mess’, the financial consequences, for instance 
resulting from possible ECJ cases, and the chances that stakeholders will try to have EU law 
enforced. On the basis of this assessment, the minister will decide whether or not to keep to 
his plans; ‘politics settle the dilemma in the end.’ In the words of one of them:
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‘When (my minister) really wants something, we will think o f a 
supporting argument. ’
Finally, two respondents disclosed a more covered way of serving their superior’s political 
objectives, namely by omitting checks on EU legality. As one drafter explained, drafters may 
decide not to inform their superior of inopportune EU legal requirements and risks involved, 
if doing so would complicate the minister’s position. When this information is held back, the 
minister ‘may always claim ignorance.’ As a superior at another division conveyed that this is 
a rather common practice:
‘EU law used to be neglected out o f ignorance, but now is neglected 
intentionally. ’
5.4. The effect of hierarchical position
Is there any effect of seniority on the role conception o f drafters? Unfortunately, firm 
conclusions are hard to produce, because of the low N. Yet, we can distill a weak tendency 
from the figures. Of the 10 drafters interviewed on this matter, one chose an initial guardian 
role, and nine an integrated position. Of those, four would eventually prioritize EU law, 
against four who would remain politically loyal. Of the seven superiors who talked to us on 
this issue, one was a translator, and six tried to integrate policy and EU law. All six would 
eventually prioritize political loyalty. Superiors thus seem more attuned to the policy needs of 
their minister, and seem more willing to compromise the ‘best view of law’ than drafters, who 
tend to be more conscientious in upholding EU law. 19
5.5. Strategies
The dilemma between policy objectives and EU legal requirements is not taken lightly by the 
respondents. Most drafters use various strategies before choosing for one of the two ultimate 
options. As for those who end up guarding EU law, the strategies vary from trying to dissuade 
their policy counterpart and eventually minister, and suggesting alternatives that could be 
reconciled with EU law. Two respondents explained how they would focus on the EU level,
19 We can think of two possible reasons for this effect: selection effect due to promotion policies, and proximity 
to the minister, which makes individuals more susceptible to policy considerations.
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by consulting the European Commission, or seeking support from other member states for the 
Dutch policy objectives.
At the political loyalty side of the spectrum, various strategies are reported as well. 
The eleven respondents who ultimately prioritize their minister’s wishes listed eight different 
strategies, on average using two strategies per person. Besides interpretation, which we 
already mentioned, the reported the following strategies: providing alternatives to their policy 
counterpart or minister (3x), building rapport to increase the interest in drafters’ arguments 
(2x), and trying to dissuade their policy counterpart or minister (3x). Other strategies 
mentioned were to find information about the limits of EU law, to negotiate with a policy 
division, and surrender on less important points of contention. Finally, two respondents 
described that they would direct their attention to the European level, and try to change the 
role expectations from that side. More specifically, one respondent would try to change EU 
law, another one would seek support from other member states or from the European 
Commission for the Dutch position.
Finally, to what extent do respondents follow the escalation ladder proposed by Purdy 
(1987)? All five strategies are mentioned by the respondents, except ‘voicing the problem to 
others’. At most, drafters will involve their superiors, so as to be able to gain access to -  
eventually- the minister. Possibly, this whistle-blowing option is considered too severe. 
Another observation is that the giving of alternatives and sketching risks is not viewed as a 
single option, but as two different strategies. Third, the empirical order of usage differs from 
that of the model. dissuasion often follows before dissuasion. In addition, several respondents 
indicated differences in sequence between strategies.
6. Conclusion
Just like any type of expert civil servant, government lawyers fulfill two roles. On the one 
hand, they have to be loyal to their political superior, fulfilling his policy wishes and 
protecting his position. On the other hand they have to behave in line with the values and 
rules of the legal profession, and ensure legality and constitutionality of the laws they draft. 
The work of government lawyers working the EU legal context, is underpinned by yet another 
dilemma: loyality for the European versus the national level. In this paper, we have focused 
on the interplay between the duties of national political loyalty versus ensuring EU legality.
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When we focus in more detail on the work of legislative drafters working in a 
Europeanized setting, the following roles emerge. The translator, working from a concern 
with political loyalty, bases his work on his minister’s instructions. He may take EU legal 
limits into account, but only in a teleological sense, advising his minister on the risk of an 
illegal course of action. Legality does not figure as intrinsic concerns. The guardian o f EU  
law does not take into account policy instructions during EU implementation or the making of 
autonomous legislation, but strives for the best interpretation of EU law. The integrating 
professional, finally, prioritizes policy instructions, as far as these can be reasonably 
reconciled with EU legal requirements.
When political loyalty and legal professionalism pose mutually inconsistent demands 
on the legislative drafter, they find themselves in a situation of role conflict. We asked 20 
drafters which role conception is central to their work and to what extent they experience 
dilemmas between their national policy role and EU legal role, and how they go about solving 
such dilemmas.
The interviews held provided us with a wealth on information on drafters’ ethos. This 
led to the following observations. To begin with, the majority of respondents recognized the 
dual roles shaping their work, and somehow try to integrate EU legal concerns with national 
policy objectives. This integral or policy sensitive attitude, as it was called, was alleged to be 
a relatively new development, relating to law in general, not just EU law.
At the same time, most respondents recognized that it is not always possible to bridge 
national policy advocacy and EU legal requirements. Role conflicts may exist, even though 
these are claimed to be an exception rather than the rule. These conflicts may arise either 
during implementation or the making of autonomous legislation.
How do drafters go about settling these strategies? Most commonly, they first try to 
somehow reconcile the conflicting roles, for instance by thinking of alternatives that are in 
line with EU law, or by trying to persuade the role sender that a certain proposed course of 
action violates EU law. Eventually, though, this may prove impossible. Most respondents 
indicated that ultimately, they would inform the minister of the risks involved in the proposed 
unlawful course of action, leave the decision whether or not to violate EU law to their 
minister- and abide by that decision. A minority of the respondents argued they would not 
give in to policy pressures, and ultimately upheld EU law against incompatible national policy 
objectives. Differentiating between drafters and their superiors, it turns out that the latter are 
more inclined to give in to policy pressure. Superiors seem more attuned to the policy needs 
of their minister, and more willing to compromise the ‘best view of EU law.’
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All in all, Dutch legislative drafters on average seem to try their best to connect EU 
law with national policy objectives, if  necessary by interpreting EU law and exploring its 
limits. They are neither ruthless translators of national policy objectives, nor conscientious 
guardians of EU law. This is laudable, as this position does justice to the ethical duality 
characterizing the work of professionals working in a democratic system. At the same time, 
most respondents ultimately prioritize their role of political loyal civil servant over that of a 
legal professional doing justice to EU law. It thus becomes clear that neither political 
appointments nor great political unrest, factors invoked to explain the ‘co-conspiring’ by 
lawyers in the US torture case, are necessary conditions for government lawyers acting upon 
political loyalty.
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